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Abstract
In a continuous-time economy with complete markets, we show how the heterogeneity in
the individual consumers’ risk attitudes and impatience would aﬀect the representative con-
sumer’s counterparts. Speciﬁcally, our formulas tell us how his risk tolerance and impatience
will change over time, and how his impatience will be aﬀected by the changes in aggregate
consumption levels. Under the assumption of equal and constant relative risk aversion across
individual consumers, we characterize his discount factor by means of a completely monotone
function of time. These results are used to analyze short-rate processes.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: D51, D53, D61, D81, D91, G12, G13.
Keywords: Representative consumer, expected utility, time additivity, multiplicative
separability, impatience, risk tolerance, state-price deﬂator, short-rate process, complete
monotonicity.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider a dynamic economic model of continuous-time consisting of multiple
consumers, rather than a single representative consumer. Our purpose is to assess the impacts
of heterogeneity of consumers’ impatience (often measured as discount rates) and risk attitudes
(often measured as absolute risk aversion or its reciprocal, absolute risk tolerance) on equilib-
rium asset pricing. It is well known that if the asset markets are complete, we can deﬁne a
representative consumer as the value function of the problem of maximizing a weighted sum
of individual consumers’ utilities and that we can use his marginal utilities, evaluated at the
aggregate consumption process, as the state-price deﬂator to price all assets at any point in
time. Then the task of investigating the impacts of heterogeneous impatience and risk attitudes
on asset prices boils down to the task of investigating the impacts of heterogeneous impatience
¤I am grateful to helpful comments from members of the Grant in Aid for Specially Promoted Research from
Japan Society for the Promotion of Sciences for “Economic Analysis on Intergenerational Problems”. The grant
is also gratefully acknowledged. I have also received a generous research grant from Ishii Memorial Founda-
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1and risk attitudes on the representative consumer’s utility function. This is what we shall do
in this paper.
We aim at establishing general properties of the representative consumer’s utility function
arising from heterogeneity. By being general, what we mean here is that the results we are after
ought to be independent of the number of (types of) consumers in the economy, the functional
forms of their utility (or felicity) functions, and the stochastic characteristics of the consumption
processes.
We also aim at establishing some formulas describing how the heterogeneity aﬀects the
representative consumer’s utility function. To see why obtaining such a formula, as opposed to
a merely qualitative prediction, is useful, let us compare one of our results (Theorem 3 and its
corollary, Corollary 3) with an existing one (Proposition 5 of Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005)).
Proposition 5 of Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005) showed that if all consumers have constant
but unequal impatience (so that the discount factor is a negative exponential function of time)
and exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the representative consumer’s impatience will
decrease over time. On the other hand, Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 give formulas that relate the
individual consumers’ impatience and cautiousness (the derivative of absolute risk tolerance) to
the derivative of the representative consumer’s impatience with respect to time. One can easily
see from our formulas that as long as there are many consumers, the representative consumer’s
impatience would decrease over time even if the assumption is decreasing absolute risk aversion
is violated just by one consumer (or by a small number of consumers). But the qualitative
prediction by Gollier and Zeckhauser, as it stands, does not allow us to judge whether the
prediction would still be true when the deviations are small. In short, while formulas allow us
to see that some conclusions are robust to small deviations from the assumptions, qualitative
predictions do not. This is why we aim at obtaining formulas rather than just qualitative
predictions.
Throughout the paper, we assume that all consumers’ utility functions are time-additive.
Although this is a fairly common assumption in ﬁnance and macroeconomics, it does exclude
some utility functions, such as recursive utilities and utilities of habit formation. By excluding
them, we do not mean that they are unimportant or uninteresting. Rather, our intention is to
make full use of the existing analytical techniques on the impacts of heterogeneous risk attitudes,
as presented in Hara, Huang, and Kuzmics (2007), under the assumption of expected utilities
and equal impatience, to the analysis of heterogeneous impatience.
This paper is most closely related to Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005). They investigated
how the representative consumer’s impatience is aﬀected by the heterogeneity of the individual
consumers’ impatience. They also showed that if there are inﬁnitely many consumers and
their impatience are exponentially distributed, then the representative consumer may exhibit
hyperbolic discounting. But their model is a deterministic one and, as discussed above, their
results tends to be qualitative. In a discrete-time model under uncertainty, Malamud and
Trubowitz (2006) showed that the way in which the representative consumer’s risk aversion
changes over time is determined by the covariance of the individual consumers’ impatience and
2cautiousness. In Sections 3 and 4, we use a similar approach to obtain more general results
with simpler proofs. The methodology of this paper closely follows that of Hara, Huang, and
Kuzmics (2007). Hara (2006) applied the techniques of Hara, Huang, and Kuzmics (2007) to
a continuous-time setup under the assumption that all consumers have the discount rate. This
paper can thus be considered as an extension of that paper to the case of unequal impatience.
An important message of the results in this paper is that if the representative consumer is
truly representative, in the sense that his utility function is derived from an explicitly modeled
group of heterogeneous consumers via the social welfare maximization problem, then his utility
function is quite likely to exhibit decreasing discount rates and unlikely to be multiplicatively
separable. This fact cast serious doubts on the plausibility of the prevalent use of constant
discount rates and multiplicatively separable utility functions for the representative consumer
in the representative-consumer models of dynamic macroeconomics.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we lay out the setup of this paper and explain
basic concepts for our analysis. In Section 3, we identify the implications of heterogeneous
impatience and risk attitudes on the representative consumer’s risk attitudes. In Section 4, we
identify the implications on his impatience. In Section 5, we summarize our results and suggest
two directions of future research.
2 Setup
The setup of this paper is as follows. The economy is subject to uncertainty, which is represented
by a probability measure space (Ω;F;P). The time span is R+ = [0;1), which is of continuous
time and inﬁnite length, although it could be [0;T] with 0 < T < 1, which is of ﬁnite length.
The gradual information revelation is represented by a ﬁltration (Ft)t2R+. There is only one
type of good on each time and state.
The economy consists of I consumers. Each consumer i has a possibly time-dependent
felicity function ui : R++ £R+ ! R, which is continuously diﬀerentiable in both variables and
at least twice continuously diﬀerentiable in the ﬁrst variable (consumption level),1 and satisﬁes
@ui(xi;t)=@xi > 0 > @2ui(xi;t)=@
¡
xi¢2 for every (xi;t) 2 R++ £ R+ and the Inada condition,
that is, for every t 2 R+, @ui(xi;t)=@xi ! 0 as xi ! 1, and @ui(xi;t)=@xi ! 1 as xi ! 0.
His utility function Ui over stochastic consumption processes are then deﬁned by requiring time













t2R+ is an adapted process taking values in R++.2
The key parameters of the felicity function ui (and thus of the utility function Ui) are risk
1The degree of continuous diﬀerentiability needed in each of the subsequent results will be made clear in its
proof.
2To be exact, we need to impose some additional restrictions on c
i to make the integral well deﬁned (ﬁnite).
As such restrictions are irrelevant to the subsequent analysis, we shall not explicitly state or impose them.




This is nothing but the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. In this
dynamic setup, this also measures tolerance to intertemporal consumption ﬂuctuations. The
partial derivative with respect to xi, @si(xi;t)=@xi, is called the cautiousness. The impatience,




An important class of utility functions is one of multiplicatively separable utility functions.
A utility function ui is multiplicatively separable if there are two functions vi : R++ ! R
and di : R+ ! R++ such that ui(xi;t) = di(t)vi(xi) for every (xi;t) 2 R++ £ R+. Then
si(xi;t) = ¡v0
i(xi)=v00
i (xi) and ri(xi;t) = ¡d0
i(t)=di(t). We thus write si(xi) for si(xi;t) and










for every t. If, in addition, there exists a ½i > 0 such that di(t) = exp(¡½it), then ri(t) = ½i for
every t 2 R+. This is the case of exponential discounting.
To ﬁnd a Pareto eﬃcient allocation of a given aggregate consumption process c = (ct)t2R+
and its supporting (decentralizing) state-price deﬂator, it is suﬃcient to choose positive numbers











Since the utility functions Ui are additive with respect to both time and states and the proba-
























for each pair of a realized aggregate consumption level x 2 R++ and time t 2 R+. It can be
4easily proved that under the stated conditions, there is a unique solution, which we denote by
(f1(x;t);:::;fI(x;t)). It can also be shown that for each fi is continuously diﬀerentiable in





This is the felicity function of the representative consumer. It need not be multiplicatively sepa-
rable between time t and the consumption level x when all individual consumers discounts future















The cautiousness is deﬁned as the partial derivative @s(x;t)=@x with respect to the aggregate
consumption level x.
The representative consumer is, of course, not an “actual” consumer, who would trade on
ﬁnancial markets. Rather, he is a theoretical construct, whom we can use to identify asset
prices. Speciﬁcally, if u is the representative consumer’s felicity function and c = (ct)t2R+ is
the aggregate consumption process, then his marginal utility process evaluated at the aggregate
consumption, (@u(ct;t)=@x)t2R+, is the state price process. This means that the price at time










Moreover, if the aggregate consumption process is deﬁned by an Ito integral, then the short-rate
process, which keeps track of interest rates for risk-free lending and borrowing for inﬁnitesimally
short intervals of time, can be represented in terms of the representative consumer’s risk tol-
erance s and impatience r, and the drift and diﬀusion terms of the aggregate consumption
process.
Although we analyze the Pareto eﬃcient allocations, if the asset markets are complete,
then our analysis is applicable to the equilibrium allocations and asset prices. This is because
the ﬁrst welfare theorem holds in complete markets, so that the equilibrium allocations are
Pareto eﬃcient and the equilibrium asset prices are given by the marginal utility process. Since
the ui (¢;t) are concave, the second welfare theorem also holds, so that every Pareto eﬃcient
allocation is an equilibrium allocation for some distribution of initial endowments. Hence an
analysis of Pareto eﬃcient allocations is also an analysis of equilibrium allocations.
The solution to the maximization problem (1) is a Pareto eﬃcient allocation. When it is an
equilibrium allocation, the individual consumers’ wealth shares, evaluated by the equilibrium
5prices, are positively related to the utility weights ¸i in (1). All the properties we shall explore
in the subsequent analysis are valid regardless of the choice of utility weights. Hence, these
properties are also valid for the equilibrium allocations regardless of wealth distributions.
To develop our analysis, we now list up some of the results that have been in the existing




























This shows that the representative consumer’s cautiousness is the weighted average of the in-
dividual consumers’ counterparts, where the weights are proportional to their absolute risk
tolerance.









(x;t) = si(fi(x;t);t)(r(x;t) ¡ ri(fi(x;t);t)): (7)
(6) means that the representative consumer’s impatience is the weighted average of the individ-
ual consumers’ counterparts where the weights are proportional to their absolute risk tolerance.
(7) means that if an individual consumer is more patient than the representative consumer, the
former’s consumption level would grow over time were the aggregate consumption level to be
constant, and the growth rate is proportional to his absolute risk tolerance.
By applying Theorem 4 of Hara, Huang, and Kuzmics (2006) to the ui(¢;t) for a ﬁxed t and













































(@fi(x;t)=@x) is the change in the cautiousness of
6consumer i arising from the increase in his consumption level, which is, in turn, caused by an
increase in the aggregate consumption level. Thus the ﬁrst term represents the direct eﬀect on
the representative consumer’s cautiousness by an increase in aggregate consumption. By (3),
the second term on the right-hand side is the weighted variance of the individual consumers’
cautiousness, divided by the representative consumer’s absolute risk aversion. This formula
therefore shows that the heterogeneity in the individual consumers’ cautiousness increases the
representative consumer’s cautiousness, thereby making his risk tolerance, as a function of
aggregate consumption levels, more convex.
3 Representative Consumer’s Risk Tolerance
We are interested in how the representative consumer’s risk tolerance and impatience vary over
time when the individual consumers’ counterparts are heterogeneous.
The ﬁrst result of this paper is concerned with how the representative consumer’s risk
tolerance varies over time. In the special case of exponential discounting, an essentially identical
formula was already given in the proof of Theorem 3.3 of Malamud and Trubowitz (2006).





















(ri(fi(x;t)) ¡ r(x;t)): (8)
This theorem tells us that the rate, per unit of time, of changes in the representative consumer’s
risk tolerance can be decomposed into two terms. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is easy to
grasp. As shown by (3), the representative consumer’s risk tolerance is the sum of the individual
consumers’ counterparts. Thus the ﬁrst term represents the direct eﬀect on risk tolerance by
time. It is equal to zero when all individual consumers’ felicity functions ui are multiplicatively
separable.
By (5) and (6), the second term of (8) is equal to the weighted covariance, multiplied by
the representative consumer’s risk tolerance, between the individual consumers’ cautiousness
and impatience, where the weights are proportional to the individual consumers’ risk tolerance.
Since the second term would be zero if all consumers’ cautiousness or impatience are equal to
one another, it captures the tendency of changes in the representative consumer’s impatience
that arise from the heterogeneity in the individual consumers’ cautiousness and impatience.
Combining the ﬁrst and second terms of the right-hand side of (8), Theorem 1 states that
the rate of changes, per unit of time, in the representative consumer’s risk tolerance is the sum
of the individual counterparts subtracted by the weighted covariance, multiplied by his own risk
tolerance, between the individual consumers’ cautiousness and impatience.

























@xi(fi(x;t);t)si(fi(x;t);t)(r(x;t) ¡ ri(fi(x;t);t)); (9)
where the last equality follows from (7). Since
X
i
si(fi(x;t);t)(r(x;t) ¡ ri(fi(x;t);t)) = 0;











This is equal to the second term of the right-hand side of (8). ///
Theorem 1 has a couple of implications. The ﬁrst one is a generalization of Theorem 3.3 of
Malamud and Trubowitz (2006) to the case of multiplicatively separable utility functions.
















for every (x;t) 2 R++ £ R+. Moreover,
1. If (s0
1(f1(x;t));:::;s0





(ri(t) ¡ rj(t)) ¸ 0 for every pair of two consumers i and j),
then @s(x;t)=@t · 0. This weak inequality holds as an equality if and only if s0
1(f1(x;t)) =
¢¢¢ = s0
I(fI(x;t)) or r1(t) = ¢¢¢ = rI(t).
2. If (s0
1(f1(x;t));:::;s0





(ri(t) ¡ rj(t)) · 0 for every pair of two consumers i and j),
then @s(x;t)=@t ¸ 0. This weak inequality holds as an equality if and only if s0
1(f1(x;t)) =
¢¢¢ = s0
I(fI(x;t)) or r1(t) = ¢¢¢ = rI(t).
An important case of this corollary is Corollary 3.4 of Malamud and Trubowitz, which deals
with constant relative risk aversion and exponential discounting. In this case, s0
i(xi) is equal to
the reciprocal of constant relative risk aversion and r(t) is equal to the constant impatience, so
that the validity of the assumption of (anti-)comonotonicity can be checked without reference
to the choice of the consumption levels xi or time t.
84 Representative Consumer’s Impatience
In this section, we turn our attention to the representative consumer’s impatience. The ﬁrst
result of this section is concerned with how the representative consumer’s impatience is aﬀected
by aggregate consumption levels.

























(ri(fi(x;t)) ¡ r(x;t)): (10)
Just as Theorem 1, this theorem tells us that the change in the representative consumer’s
impatience can be decomposed into two terms. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is easy to















(@fi(x;t)=@x) is the change in the impatience of consumer
i arising from the increase in his consumption level, which, in turn, caused by an increase
in the aggregate consumption level. Thus the ﬁrst term represents the direct eﬀect on the
representative consumer’s impatience by the change in aggregate consumption. It is equal to
zero when all individual consumers’ felicity functions ui are multiplicatively separable.
The second term is equal to the weighted covariance, divided by the representative con-
sumer’s risk tolerance, between the individual consumers’ cautiousness and impatience, where
the weights are proportional to the individual consumers’ risk tolerance. Since the second term
would be zero if all consumers’ cautiousness or impatience are equal to one another, it captures
the tendency of changes in the representative consumer’s impatience that arise from the hetero-
geneity in the individual consumers’ cautiousness and impatience. Theorem 2 states that the
change in the representative consumer’s impatience is the sum of the individual counterparts,
added by the weighted covariance, divided by his own risk tolerance, between the individual
consumers’ cautiousness and impatience.





































































































The proof is thus completed. ///
In the case of multiplicatively separable utility functions, we have the following corollary.


















for every (x;t) 2 R++ £ R+. Moreover,
1. If (s0
1(f1(x;t));:::;s0





(ri(t) ¡ rj(t)) ¸ 0 for every pair of two consumers i and j),
then @r(x;t)=@x ¸ 0. This weak inequality holds as an equality if and only if s0
1(f1(x;t)) =
¢¢¢ = s0
I(fI(x;t)) or r1(t) = ¢¢¢ = rI(t).
2. If (s0
1(f1(x;t));:::;s0





(ri(t) ¡ rj(t)) · 0 for every pair of two consumers i and j),
then @r(x;t)=@x · 0. This weak inequality holds as an equality if and only if s0
1(f1(x;t)) =
¢¢¢ = s0
I(fI(x;t)) or r1(t) = ¢¢¢ = rI(t).
10We next give a formula for @r(x;t)=@t, which shows how the representative consumer’s
impatience varies over time.












































This theorem tells us that the rate, per unit of time, of changes in the representative con-
sumer’s impatience can be decomposed into three terms. The ﬁrst term is easy to grasp. As
shown by (6), the representative consumer’s impatience is equal to the weighted average of the
individual consumers’ counterparts, where the weights are proportional to their risk tolerance.
Thus the ﬁrst term represents the direct eﬀect, by time, on the representative consumer’s im-
patience, while the weights are hypothetically ﬁxed. It is equal to zero if all the consumers’
felicity functions ui are of exponential discounting.
The third term represents the change in the representative consumer’s impatience caused
by the impact on the individual consumers’ risk tolerance by time, and also by the impact on
their impatience by consumption levels. It is equal to zero if all consumers’ felicity functions
are multiplicatively separable.
The second term is most interesting. It represents the impact on the representative con-
sumer’s impatience when the individual consumers have diﬀering impatience. As mentioned
above, the representative consumer’s impatience is equal to the weighted average of the indi-
vidual consumers’ counterparts, and the weights are proportional to their risk tolerance. If
their impatience are diﬀerent, then the risk-sharing rules fi would depend on time t; that
is, the partial derivative @fi(x;t)=@t would be diﬀerent from zero. Unless the cautiousness,
@si(fi(x;t);t)=@xi, is zero (which would be the case if ui exhibited constant absolute, rather
than relative, risk aversion), the change in consumption levels has an impact on the individual
consumers’ risk tolerance, and thus on the representative consumer’s impatience, which is the
weighted average of the individual consumers’ impatience, with the weights given by their risk
tolerance. The second term, therefore, captures the change in the representative consumer’s
impatience arising from the heterogeneity in the individual consumers’ impatience.




































































































































































@xi (fi(x;t);t)si (fi(x;t);t)(ri (fi(x;t);t) ¡ r(x;t)): (15)
Thus, by (13), (14), and (15), we obtain (12). ///
12The right-hand side of (12) in Theorem 3 can be much simpliﬁed if we concentrate on the case
of multiplicatively separable felicity functions. The following corollary follows from Theorem 3
and (6)

















for every (x;t) 2 R++ £ R+. Moreover,
1. If r0(t) · 0 and s0
i(fi(x;t)) ¸ 0 for every i, then @r(x;t)=@t · 0. This weak inequality
holds as an equality if and only if r0
1(t) = ¢¢¢ = r0
I(t) = 0 and, in addition, either r1(t) =
¢¢¢ = rI(t) or s0
1(f1(x;t)) = ¢¢¢ = s0
I(fI(x;t)) = 0.
2. If r0(t) ¸ 0 and s0
i(fi(x;t)) · 0 for every i, then @r(x;t)=@t ¸ 0. This weak inequality
holds as an equality if and only if r0
1(t) = ¢¢¢ = r0
I(t) = 0 and, in addition, either r1(t) =
¢¢¢ = rI(t) or s0
1(f1(x;t)) = ¢¢¢ = s0
I(fI(x;t)) = 0.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated implications of heterogeneous impatience in an economy populated by
multiple consumers who have time-separable utility functions. We have found some formulas
showing how the representative consumer’s risk attitudes will change over time and how the
change in aggregate consumption levels aﬀect his impatience. These formulas clarify when
and, if so, how, his felicity function fails to be multiplicatively separable. We have also found
a formula showing how his impatience will change over time. This formula clariﬁes how the
change in his impatience is determined by the heterogeneity of individual consumers’ impatience
and cautiousness.
Based on these results, we have characterized the representative consumer’s discount factor,
using a property called complete monotonicity. We have also applied these results to derive
some properties of the short-rate process in an economy of heterogeneous consumers.
There are some issued yet to be explored in this setting. First, while we concentrated on the
case of time-additive utility functions, we should look into whether there is any coherence of our
analysis with recursive or stochastic diﬀerential utility functions.3 These utility functions are in
general not time-additive, but they are still tractable and useful for many applications. It would
therefore be reasonable to try to extend our analysis to these utility functions. Second, we have
not investigated whether the heterogeneity of impatience would give rise to most commonly
used properties in the literature on the term structure of interest rates. One of such properties
is mean reversion, so that the drift term of the short-rate process will become negative if the
short rate exceeds some threshold, while it will become positive if the short rate goes below
3I am grateful to Tomoyuki Nakajima for suggesting this line of research.
13the threshold. It will quite important to identify under what conditions of heterogeneity of
impatience the short-rate process would be mean-reverting.4
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